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COMPANY, UTAH CORPORATIONS.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAII
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
INSURANCE CO:MMISSION

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from the order of the District
Court of Salt Lake County which upheld an order of the
Department of Business Regulation, Insurance Commission, State of Utah, by which order the appellants herein
were directed to cease and desist from selling, offering or
promising to give, or allowing in any manner whatsoever any shares of stock or other securities issued or at
any time to be issued, or any interest or rights therein,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in connection with or as an inducement to the purchase
of any insurance.
The facts involved in this case are rather simple
and, as found by the Insurance Commissioner as having
importance in the determination of this matter, are as
follows:
1. The record overwhelmingly establishes the fact
that the companies here involved are insurance companies.
A. They call themselves insurance companies by their names : American Buyers Insurance Company; Producers Mutual Insurance
Company.
B. They allege that they are in the insurance
business in their petition for review. (Para. I (c)
& (f).)
C. The Articles of Incorporation state that
they have organized for the purpose of "engaging
in the business of Life Insurance in all of its
branches."
D. The testimony of the representatives of
American Buyers Insurance Company shows that
they have in force $11,553,700 worth of insurance
(Tr. 21); and have insured 3,679 people (Tr. 22,
26).
E. The testimony of the representatives of
Producers Mutual Insurance Company shows that
2
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they have in force $13,399,242 worth of insurance
(Tr. 47); and have insured 4,658 people (Tr. 48).
F. Both companies are in the insurance business and are selling securities together with insurance policies (Tr. 26, 47).
2.

Both companies are corporations.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.

THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HAS CLEARLY INDICATED THAT IT IS THEIR
INTENTION THAT THE SALE OF INSURANCE
BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM THE SALE OF
SECURITIES; THAT THE MERITS OF THE INSURANCE POLICIES OFFERED BY INSURANCE COMPANIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SEPARATE
FROM THE MERITS OF ANY SECURITIES WHICH
MIGHT BE OFFERED BY INSURANCE COMpANIES OR INSURANCE SALESMEN.

POINT II.
STATUTES OF OUR STATE CLEARLY DEFINE
THE WORDS "INSURER" AND "PERSON" AND
THE APPELLANTS ARE CLEARLY WITHIN THE
STATUTORY DEFINITIONS.

POINT III.
THE APPELLANTS CONTEND THAT THEY ARE
EXEMPT FROM THE OPERATION OF THE STATUTES CITED UNDER POINT I ; HOWEVER, THE
STATUTES CITED IN POINT I ARE CLEARLY
APPLICABLE TO SAID COMPANIES.

3
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POINT IV.
THE INSURANCE CODE OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROVIDES FOR SERIOUS PENALTIES TO BE IMPOSED UPON INSURANCE COMPANIES FOR THE
VIOLATION OF SECTION 31-27-15, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HAS CLEARLY INDICATED THAT IT IS THEIR
INTENTION THAT THE SALE OF INSURANCE
BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM THE SALE OF
SECURITIES; THAT THE MERITS OF THE INSURANCE POLICIES OFFERED BY INSURANCE COMPANIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SEPARATE
FROM THE MERITS OF ANY SECURITIES WHICH
MIGHT BE OFFERED BY INSURAN·CE COMPANIES OR INSURANCE SALESMEN.

The particular section of our Insurance Code which
has given rise to this action is found in 31-27-15, U.C.A.
1953, and reads in part as follows:
No insurer, general agent, agent, broker, solicitor, or other person, shall, as an inducement to
the purchase of insurance, or in connection with
any insurance transaction, provide in any policy
for, or offer, or sell, buy, or offer or promise to
buy or give, or promise, or allow, in any manner
whatsoever:
( 1) any shares of stock or other securities
issued or at any time to be issued or any interest
therein or rights thereto;
•

•

*

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah had the
4
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statutory predecessor of this section before it in the
case of Utah Association of Life Underwriters v. Mountain States Life Insurance Co., 58 Utah 579, 200 P. 673
( 1921). On page 677 of the foregoing decision, the court
stated as follows:
* * * Then, again, it is manifest that the statute
was enacted for the protection of the public and
especially for the protection of those who are
solicited to enter into life insurance contracts
who may lack the experience and the opportunity
to guard themselves against the wiles of the experienced life insurance solicitor. The statute
should therefore be construed so as to accomplish
its purpose and so as to protect those it intends
to protect. If the plan that is pursued by the
Company in disposing of its capital stock as outlined above is not contrary to the provisions
of our statute, then we cannot conceive of any plan
which merely disposed of the Company's stock
in connection with the contract of insurance that
would be contrary thereto. After a careful consideration of all of the evidence which is not and
cannot be contradicted or explained, we are all
agreed that the plan pursued by the Company in
taking subscriptions for stock in connection with
contracts of insurance is clearly violative of the
provisions of our statute, and if permitted by this
court would soon lead back to the very practices
in writing life insurance which the statute, we
think wisely, prohibits.
See the related statutory provision 1n Section 31-7-17,
U.C.A. 1953.
POINT II.
STATUTES OF OUR STATE CLEARLY DEFINE
THE WORDS "INSURER" AND "PERSON" AND

5
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THE APPELLANTS ARE CLEARLY WITHIN THE
STATUTORY DEFINITIONS.

Section 31-1-10, U.C.A. 1953, defines "insurer" as
follows:
"Insurer" includes all persons engaged in the
assumptiton of insurance risks. A reciprocal or
inter-insurance exchange is an "insurer" as used
in this code.
Section 31-1-9 defines "person" as follows:
"Person" means any individual, company, insurer, association, organization, reciprocal or
inter-insurance exchange, partnership busjness
.
'
trust, or corporatwn.
The appellants do not contend that they are not
"insurers" and "persons" ~s set out in the above definitions. The Department of Business Regulation, and the
Insurance Commissioner, of the State of Utah made an
express finding of fact that the appellants are indeed
"insurers" and "persons", which finding was sustained
by the District Court of Salt Lake County when the
appellants took their appeal to that court. Therefore,
no question is raised in this appeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of fact of
the Commission.
POINT III.
THE APPELLANTS CONTEND THAT THEY ARE
EXEMPT FROM THE OPERATION OF THE STATUTES CITED UNDER POINT I; HOWEVER, THE
STATUTES CITED IN POINT I ARE CLEARLY
APPLICABLE TO SAID COMPANIES.

The main issue in this appeal for review centers
6
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around the question as to whether or not these insurance
companies are subject to the prohibitions set forth in
the statutes above cited in Point I. The claim for exmnption rests upon Section 31-31-15 which reads as follows:
Except as provided in this chapter, every such
association shall not be subject to the other provisions of this code unless the context clearly indicates applicability to such association.
It is noted immediately that the exemption, if any
exists, is qualified or limited to a great degree. This
limited exemption is to be more narrowly construed in
view of the fact that in Section 31-31-1 we find that the
company shall "* * * comply with all the requirements
and provisions of this chapter, and the general insurance
laws of Utah relative to said association * * *."
If this last quoted portion of Section 31-31-1 is to
have any significance at all, it would appear that we
must find in the general insurance laws of Utah many
places where said laws are "clearly applicable" to companies that purport to be mutual benefit associations
such as the companies before this Court. It is to be further noted that the terms and scope of Section 31-27-15
(quoted in Point I) are of the very broadest form; and
under the definitions of our statutes above set out and
the undisputed facts of this case, it must clearly appear
that Section 31-27-15 is applicable to these companies.
The companies here before the Court, in face of the undisputed evidence of their insurance company activities
and of their corporate status, failed to introduce any evidence whatsoever to show that their business was not

7
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that of "the assumption of insurance risks" or that they
are not a "person" under the meaning of our statutes.
The pride of these companies, as indicated by the record,
is that they have written millions of dollars worth of
insurance, and that they have consistently used the insurance language and have spoken of their policies as
insurance policies.
It is to be further noted that the particular section
which prohibits the activity carried on by the appellants
is found in the Insurance Code in the chapter entitled,
"Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices." By the same
reasoning as used by appellants and with considerably
more force than their argument that they are exempt
from Section 31-27-15, the appellants could argue that
they are also exempt from Section 31-27-3 which reads
as follows:
No person shall knowingly file with any public official nor knowingly make, publish, or disseminate any financial statement of an insurer
which does not accurately state the insurer's financial condition.
Perhaps the appellants could argue with some force that
they are exempt from the provisions of Section 31-2718 which reads as follows:
No person shall by misrepresentations or
by misleading comparisons, induce or tend to induce any insured to lapse, terminate, forfeit, surrender, retain, or convert any insurance policy.
The point to be made by this line of discussion is that
these insurance companies who are engaged as they are
8
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in the business of selling insurance cannot be reasonably
construed to be exempt from those provisions of our statutes which would prevent them from preying upon either
other insurance companies or upon a gullible or uninforn1ed public. Section 31-27-15 uses the most all-inclusive language that can be devised to bring everyone in
the insurance business under its provisions. Surely this
section is clearly applicable to appellants.
POINT IV.
THE INSURANCE ·CODE OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROVIDES FOR SERIOUS PENALTIES TO BE IMPOSED UPON INSURANCE COMPANIES FOR THE
VIOLATION OF SECTION 31-27-15, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953.

Section 31-27-16 provides as follows:
The commissioner may revoke the certificates
of authority or licenses of any insurer, general
agent, agent, broker, or solicitor guilty of violating any provision contained in sections 31-27-14
and 31-27-15.
Section 31-7-17 contains a mandatory revocation of
an insurance company's certificate of authority when it
violates that provision, which provision is the same in
purport as Section 31-27-15 which was used by the Insurance Commission as its authority to issue its cease and
desist order. It is not the effect nor the purpose of the
order of the Insurance Commission herein appealed from
to put these companies out of business by revoking their
certificates of authority, but the order merely requires
that the practices of these companies in selling securities
and selling insurance be separated. The order of the
9
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Insurance Commission is clearly fair and equitable in
face of the serious penalties set forth in our statutes.
DISTINCTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
I. The majority of the authorities cited by the appellants are cases involving fraternal benefit associations
which under our law, and under the statutes governing
the cases cited, have express and unequivocal exemptions
and, therefore, are not authorities for the proposition
for which the appellants contend. The few cases involving mutual benefit associations are decided under statutory provisions which are different from our Section
31-31-15 and have strongly worded exemptions. However, by the sa1ne token the mutual benefit provisions
of the insurance laws of those states are much more complete and far-reaching than the very short and limited
treatment given to the field of n1utual benefit associations in our own Insurance Code.

II. The appellants lay considerable stress upon the
fact that prior statutory provisions, particularly governing Inutual benefit associations, had an express prohibition against the activities such as carried on by appellants; but, in the 1947 codification of our insurance laws,
that specific prohibition was not carried over into the
particular section of the Insurance Code dealing with
mutual benefit associations. However, it appears to
counsel that this is of no particular significance inasmuch
as a careful review of the insurance sections of our previous statutes shows that almost every different type of
insurance company named in those previous enactments

10
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was covered by this specific prohibition against the
selling of stock and securities. However, when the 1947
Code was adopted, the various specific prohibitive sections under the various types of insurance companies
were all removed and put into a single chapter known as
Section 31-27, and entitled "Unfair or Deceptive Acts
or Practices" and given the widest kind of language
so that all insurance companies were included under the
prohibition unless there is a specific and unequivocal
exemption therefrom. It appears that the intention of
the Legislature was nothing more than to cut down and
eliminate duplication in the various sections of the insurance law in respect to this point, and does not appear
to be an intent to give these companies a green light
on acts and practices which have for many years been
considered as unfair and deceptive.
III. The appellants have seemed to put some stress
upon the alleged fact that the Insurance Commissioner
did at one time issue certificates of authority to these
companies. It is the view of counsel that appellants have
overstated their case when they have imputed knowledge
to the Insurance Commissioner of activities in their
full scope and effect as carried on by these companies.
The record clearly shows that in the State of Utah there
are more than 521 insurance companies certified by the
Insurance Commissioner and it is presumptuous indeed to
impute full knowledge of the activities of these 521 insurance companies to the Insurance Commissioner. It is
true that the articles of incorporation were filed with
the Insurance Commissioner.
11
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It could hardly be contended by appellants that
should the Insurance C01nmissioner inadvertently, inappropriately, or wrongfully make an order, or issue a
certificate of authority, he is forever bound by that action
and is prevented from correcting that Inistake. Stated
another way, it would seem clear that if an administrative agency grants some order or certificates of authority
which they have no power or right under applicable statutes to grant, the order or certificate of authority so
granted is open to attack or correction by direct action
of the administrative agency issuing said order or granting said authority . We see by the decisions of our own
court that the order or certificate of authority granted
wrongfully by the Insurance Commissioner is open to
collateral attack in the courts of our State. (See Utah
Association of Life Underwrtiers v. Mountain States
Life Insurance Co., supra, where the Supreme Court revoked the certificate of authority of the Mountain States
Life Insurance Co. which had been issued by the Insurance Commissioner under a claim of authority by said
commissioner.) The doctrine of administrative interpretation of the law cannot be binding upon the courts and is
used only as an aid by the courts in helping resolve a
problem which has arisen because some party has complained of an action of the administrative agency, and
certainly would not have any application where the
agency itself has decided to correct what later experience
has indicated to be an obvious mistake. This last line of
reasoning is not to be taken as an admission that the
Insurance Commissioner, prior to this time, had con-

12
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strued the statutes of our State in the manner contended
for by appellants.
CONCLUSION
It would appear to counsel that the action taken by
the Department of Business Regulation and the Insurance Commissioner is eminently fair and unquestionably
in harmony with the facts and the law applicable thereto.
The facts clearly establish that appellants are both "insurers" and "persons" within the meaning of our Insurance Code and must of necessity fall clearly under the
prohibitive language of Section 31-27-15, U.C.A. 1953.
The only organizations given an exemption from general
insurance laws are hospital service plans, fraternal
benefit associations, mutual fire companies, and cooperatives. However, cooperatives and mutual fire insurance
companies are by their terms specifically brought under
Section 31-27- ; the exemption from the other part of
the Insurance Code is unequivocal except for the places
where they are specifically brought under other provisions; the significance of this fact would seem to be that
mutual benefit associations will be brought under many
of the general provisions of the Insurance Code without
the Legislature having taken the job of setting them forth
specifically.
It is respectfully submitted that the order brought
to the Court for review was a proper order, amply supported, and arrived at a just result.
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
PETER M. LOWE
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent.
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